CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 54

APRIL 2022

NUMBER 2

Article
Judicial Consensus: Why the Supreme Court Should
Decide Its Cases Unanimously
DAVID ORENTLICHER
Like Congress and other deliberative bodies, the Supreme Court decides its cases
by majority vote. If at least five of the nine Justices come to an agreement, their view
prevails. But why is that the case? Majority voting for the Court is not spelled out in
the Constitution, a federal statute, or Supreme Court rules.
Nor it is obvious that the Court should decide by a majority vote. When the public
votes on a ballot measure, it typically makes sense to follow the majority. The general
will of the electorate ought to govern. But judicial decisions are not supposed to reflect
popular sentiment. Rather, they must respect the rule of law. Thus, on many matters,
courts override the preferences of the majority to protect the rights of the minority.
Moreover, juries in the United States decide their cases unanimously. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, it is important for jury decisions to emerge from a
deliberative process that represents the views of the entire community.
For the same reasons why it is important for juries to decide cases unanimously,
so is it important for the Supreme Court, as well as other appellate courts, to decide
cases unanimously. In particular, unanimous decisions would be better decisions, and
they would be fairer decisions. They would be better because they would take into
account a broader range of relevant perspectives, and they would be fairer because
they would reflect the views of both sides of the ideological spectrum.
Deciding cases by consensus would not be new for the Supreme Court. For most of its
history, it operated under a norm of consensus, with dissenting opinions written infrequently.
This Article will make several points, which have gone almost entirely
unrecognized to date: (1) Majority voting does not make sense on an appellate court,
(2) majority voting on an appellate court violates principles of due process, and (3)
unanimous decisions promote the quality and fairness of judicial decision-making by
ensuring that decisions reflect a broad range of perspectives. In addition, (4)
unanimous decision-making is more faithful than majority voting to the original intent
of the Framers, (5) it is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, and (6) the
experience of the Supreme Court, juries, and other decision-making bodies indicates
that a rule of unanimity would work well.
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Judicial Consensus: Why the Supreme Court Should
Decide Its Cases Unanimously
DAVID ORENTLICHER *
INTRODUCTION
Like Congress and other deliberative bodies, the Supreme Court decides
its cases by majority vote.1 If at least five of the nine Justices come to an
agreement, their view prevails.
But why is that the case? Majority voting for the Court is not spelled out
in the Constitution, a federal statute, or Supreme Court rules.
Nor it is obvious that the Court should decide by a majority vote. When
the public votes on a ballot measure, it typically makes sense to follow the
majority.2 The general will of the electorate ought to govern. But judicial
decisions are not supposed to reflect popular sentiment. Rather, they must
respect the rule of law. Thus, on many matters, courts override the
preferences of the majority to protect the rights of the minority.
Moreover, majority voting on the Supreme Court exacerbates the
polarized politics that plague the United States. When a conservative or
liberal majority can impose its views on the country, it gives each side of the
ideological spectrum even greater incentive to fight for control of the Oval
Office and the Senate so that side can control the judicial appointment
process. Or elected officials might manipulate the appointment process to
ensure a Court majority for its side, as when U.S. Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell blocked the appointment of Merrick Garland in 2016 and
*
Judge Jack and Lulu Lehman Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. MD, JD, Harvard University. I am grateful for comments by Peter Bayer; Eve Hanan;
Michael Miller; G. Michael Parsons; Ronald Krotoszynski; Barry Solaiman; Samuel Thumma; Robin
Fretwell Wilson; and participants at the Sixth Annual ACS Constitutional Law Scholars Forum (2021);
the 2020 Global Conference on Constitution-Making and Constitutional Change, University of Texas at
Austin School of Law; the Tenth Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law (2019); and the 2019 conference on Dignity, Tradition, & Constitutional Due Process:
Competing Judicial Paradigms, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. I also
am grateful for the research assistance of Jacqueline Alvarez, Youngwoo Ban, Lena Rieke, and Greer
Sullivan and the editorial assistance of Marla Katz, Kaylee Navarra, and Katie McKeon.
1
To be sure, the U.S. Senate employs a filibuster rule that requires a sixty-vote supermajority to
end debate on a legislative proposal. About Filibusters and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov
/about/powers-procedures/filibusters-cloture.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2021). However, the vote on
adoption requires only a simple majority. About Voting, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/about/
powers-procedures/voting.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2021).
2
I say “typically” because, as I later observe, majorities may need to be restrained from abusing
their power.
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fast-tracked the nomination of Justice Amy Coney Barrett just before the
2020 presidential election.3
One side’s manipulation invites retaliation by the other side, further
aggravating partisan conflict. When Justice Barrett was nominated and
appointed, many on the left proposed expansion of the Court in the event
that the 2020 elections resulted in a Democratic president and a Democratic
majority in the Senate.4 And after Democrats eliminated the filibuster for
lower court nominees in 2013,5 Republicans eliminated the filibuster for
Supreme Court nominees in 2017.6
One might observe that the Framers of the Constitution identified the kinds
of voting that require more than a simple majority. For example, supermajority
votes are needed for approval of treaties by the Senate,7 ratification of
constitutional amendments by the states,8 or conviction of government officials
by the Senate on charges of impeachment.9 Arguably, if the Constitution does
not explicitly require a supermajority, a simple majority is sufficient.
But under this view, juries could decide cases by a simple majority, and
they cannot. The Constitution does not address voting rules for juries.
Moreover, in 1789, Congress rejected a draft of the Sixth Amendment that
included a requirement of unanimity for juries.10 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has held that the right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments includes a right to a unanimous jury in federal criminal and
civil cases.11 The Court also has required juror unanimity in state criminal
trials under the Sixth Amendment,12 and states generally require unanimous

3
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died on September 18, 2020, and the Senate confirmed Justice
Barrett on October 26, 2020. Carl Hulse, How Mitch McConnell Delivered Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s
Rapid Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/27/us/mcconnell-barrett-confirma
tion.html (Nov. 3, 2020).
4
See, e.g., E.J. Dionne Jr., Enlarging the Supreme Court Is the Only Answer to the Right’s Judicial
Radicalism, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thehigh-cost-of-confirming-amy-coney-barrett/2020/10/24/8d5a236a-156f-11eb-bc10-40b25382f1be_story.ht
ml (advocating for the expansion of the Court’s size as a “remedy to conservative court-packing”). Senate
Democrats also would have to eliminate or waive the filibuster rule to pass legislation expanding the
Court. Sydney Ember & Astead W. Herndon, End the Filibuster? Pack the Court? The Left Is Pushing
Biden, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/28/us/politics/democrats-filibuster-supreme-co
urt-biden.html (Oct. 12, 2020).
5
The filibuster also was eliminated for nominations to executive branch positions. Jeremy W.
Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1.
6
Matt Flegenheimer, Republicans Gut Filibuster Rule to Lift Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2017,
at A1.
7
Two-thirds support is required. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
8
Three-fourths of the states must approve a constitutional amendment. Id. art. V. In addition,
supermajorities of two-thirds are required to propose amendments. Id.
9
Two-thirds of the Senate must vote to convict on impeachment charges. Id. art. I, § 3.
10
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 409 (1972).
11
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948).
12
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394–95 (2020).
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or supermajority votes in civil trials. Similarly, the Court could conclude
that it must decide its cases unanimously to meet the Due Process Clause’s
requirement of impartial judging.
As I will argue in this Article, for many of the reasons why it is important
for juries to decide cases unanimously, so is it important for the Supreme
Court, as well as other appellate courts, to decide cases unanimously. In
particular, unanimous decisions would be better decisions, and they would be
fairer decisions. They would be better because they would take into account a
broader range of relevant perspectives, and they would be fairer because they
would reflect the views of both sides of the ideological spectrum.
Deciding cases by consensus would not be new for the Supreme Court.14
For most of its history, it operated under a norm of consensus, with dissenting
opinions being written infrequently.15 There also is useful precedent for
unanimous decision-making from Europe. In France, Belgium, Italy, and
other countries, there is a practice of “apparent unanimity,” in which the high
courts issue a single opinion, with no dissenting opinions, and without
disclosing the votes of the justices.16 While this practice does not require a
unanimous vote,17 it does lead to decisions that take into account the views of
all justices on the courts. And as mentioned, state criminal and federal civil
and criminal juries in the United States must issue unanimous verdicts.
This Article will make several points, which have gone almost entirely
unrecognized to date:18 (1) Majority voting does not make sense on an appellate
13
The Court has neither accepted nor rejected a unanimity requirement for state civil juries, per
incorporation. For civil trials, states tend to require unanimity or supermajorities of three-fourths or
five-sixths. In addition, a small number of states allow decisions by a simple majority. BUREAU OF JUST.
STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STATE CT. ORG. 2004 23337 tbl.42 (2004), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/
pub/pdf/sco04.pdf.
14
This Article uses the terms “unanimous” decisions and “consensus” decisions interchangeably.
15
See infra Part II.
16
ROSA RAFFAELLI, EUR. PARLIAMENT, DISSENTING OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE
MEMBER STATES 17–18 (2012), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201304/2013
0423ATT64963/20130423ATT64963EN.pdf.
17
In Belgium, for example, a majority vote is sufficient to decide a case. J. Lyn Entrikin, Global
Judicial Transparency Norms: A Peek Behind the Robes in a Whole New World—A Look at Global
“Democratizing” Trends in Judicial Opinion-Issuing Practices, 18 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 55,
96 (2019). In Austria, a majority vote generally is sufficient, but unanimity is required for some
constitutional issues. Id. at 95. Similarly, Germany supplements majority voting with a supermajority
requirement on some matters. Katalin Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts, 14
GERMAN L.J. 1345, 1361 (2013).
18
There are occasional articles discussing the appropriateness of majority voting on courts. See,
e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE L.J. 1692,
16941701 (2014) (examining the rationales for majority voting on courts); Guha Krishnamurthi, For
Judicial Majoritarianism, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1201, 1211–21 (2020) (defending majority voting on
courts). There also is a more common debate on whether separation of powers principles require
supermajority voting when the Supreme Court invalidates legislation. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker,
Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78
IND. L.J. 73 (2003) (exploring the arguments regarding a supermajority rule for invalidating federal
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court, (2) majority voting on an appellate court violates principles of due process,
and (3) unanimous decisions promote the quality and fairness of judicial
decision-making by ensuring that decisions reflect a broad range of perspectives.
In addition, (4) unanimous decision-making is more faithful than majority voting
to the original intent of the Framers, (5) it is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, and (6) the experience of the Supreme Court, juries, and other
decision-making bodies indicates that a rule of unanimity would work well.19
I.THE VIRTUES OF UNANIMOUS DECISION-MAKING
The question of majority versus unanimous voting connects to the
question of how many Justices should sit on the Supreme Court. Just as the
Constitution does not prescribe a voting rule for the Court, it does not speak
to the number of Justices. Article III simply states, “The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”20
With the Constitution silent on the number of Justices, Congress has
decided that matter, initially in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and later in
subsequent acts. The Supreme Court started with a bench of six, and over the
years has varied in size from five to ten Justices, ultimately settling on its
current number of nine in 1869.21 According to statute, the Supreme Court
“shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate
justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”22
Why nine Justices? Why not just one Justice? If the role of the Supreme
Court is, in the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, “to say what the law
is,”23 rather than to represent the preferences of the public, one intelligent and
well-trained Justice should be sufficient. Someone with sharp analytical skills
and keen judgment. Say a Marshall (John or Thurgood), a Louis Brandeis, or
a Sandra Day O’Connor. If we can rely on a single judge at the trial court
level, why not at the Supreme Court, too?
statutes). Another proposal would require a supermajority or unanimous vote of the Justices to deny a
petition for certiorari. G. Michael Parsons, Contingent Design & the Court Reform Debate, 23 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 795, 839–42 (2021).
19
While I will focus on the U.S. Supreme Court in this Article, the arguments in favor of unanimous
decisions also apply to other courts of appeal, such as federal intermediate courts of appeal, state supreme
courts, and state intermediate courts of appeal. Also, while this Article proposes a unanimous vote for
the Court’s decisions, it does not propose a change in the four-vote requirement to grant certiorari. Given
the substantial reduction in the Court’s docket over time, Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining
the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM . & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1228–29 (2012), it would not be
prudent to raise the threshold for the Court to accept new cases. Rather, it might make sense to lower the
threshold. Parsons, supra note 18, at 837.
20
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
21
Changes in the Court’s composition reflected both partisan considerations and the desire to have
a Justice preside over each judicial circuit. F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of
the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 664–69 (2009).
22
28 U.S.C. § 1.
23
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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Perhaps, one might observe, even the wisest persons benefit from
sounding boards and devil’s advocates. It is important to test out one’s
theories on other people, who can identify potential weaknesses.
But a single Justice can do that without other Justices. Dialogue with
lawyers at oral argument or discussion with law clerks can provide sufficient
input, as can briefs from the parties and amici and commentaries in law reviews,
op-ed pages, or blogs. A single Justice could turn to a group of experienced
judicial clerks before rendering decisions, just as a single president turns to
advisers for guidance before issuing policy directives. We have nine Justices
because we want multiple people deciding, not just advising.
This takes us to the question why we want multiple people deciding. The
analogy of the jury is useful in providing an answer.
In requiring unanimous juries, the Supreme Court has identified a few
key considerations. We should have a fair cross-section of the community
participate in the decision-making process, and the members of the jury
should reach a consensus decision after careful deliberation.24 These
considerations also apply to decisions by the Supreme Court. It is important
to have Justices with a range of backgrounds and ideological perspectives
who reach a consensus decision after careful deliberation.
The benefits of collective, consensus decision-making after careful
deliberation are well recognized by deliberative democracy theory. When people
come together for a thoughtful and reasoned exchange of ideas and arguments,
they become more aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the opinions of
others, as well as of their own views.25 As a result, they make better decisions.26
Accordingly, collective decision-making has long been commended,
dating at least as far back as ancient Greece. For example, in Politics,
Aristotle wrote in favor of political control by the many collectively, rather
than by the few best, in a society.27
A concrete example will be useful––say, whether the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution protects a right to medical aid in dying (i.e., a
right to physician-assisted suicide).28
24
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972). While the Supreme Court has required jury
pools to represent a fair cross-section of the community, it has not extended that requirement to the juries
themselves. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990).
25
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 42 (1996).
26
Id. at 43; Maya Sen, Courting Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative Democracy in the
American Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303, 307–08 (2013). As Sen
observes, the current practice of majority voting on the Supreme Court discourages the kind of
deliberation that deliberative democracy envisions. Id. at 321–23.
27
ARISTOTLE, Book Three: Definition and Division of Regime, in THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 112
(Peter L. Phillips Simpson trans. & ed., 1997). See also Daniela Cammack, Aristotle on the Virtue of the
Multitude, 41 POL. THEORY 175, 185–186 (2013) (observing that Aristotle, Xenophon, Aesop, and
Demosthenes all wrote about the benefits of collective action).
28
In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the Court declined to recognize a
constitutional right, but with more and more states legalizing aid in dying, the issue is likely to come
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In considering this question, a number of factors are relevant. On one
hand, patients might choose aid in dying to bring relief from intolerable
suffering. Or maybe they ask for a lethal dose of medication, not to use
immediately, but to ensure that if suffering does become intolerable, they will
possess the means to gain relief. On the other hand, the state has an important
interest in preserving life and also in preventing aid in dying when the patient’s
request is compromised by diminished decision-making capacity.29
In determining whether there should be a right to aid in dying, courts
have to weigh these factors, together with other relevant factors, and
inevitably different Justices will come to different conclusions. Some will
place greater weight on concerns about suffering or individual autonomy,
while others will place greater weight on concerns about compromised
decision-making or the sanctity of life. In an ideal world, we could determine
how the balance among competing factors should come out, and therefore,
which Justice’s reasoning and conclusions were correct.
In our actual world, there is no clear answer on how the balance should
play out. Experts can differ as to the meaning of the Due Process Clause and
how it weighs competing interests. Accordingly, a group of Justices will
bring justifiably different understandings to the aid-in-dying question, and
they will strike the balance among the different interests in different places.
In other words, we have no good basis for favoring one Justice’s analysis
over another’s.30 Rather, we need to take into account each Justice’s views.
We all benefit when legal rules reflect the perspectives of both sides of
the ideological spectrum. Neither side has a monopoly on the truth; both
sides have their policy blind spots. Justices on the right can steer their liberal
counterparts away from misguided decisions and toward desirable decisions.
Justices on the left can do the same for their conservative colleagues.31
While unanimous voting ensures due consideration of all of the Justices’
perspectives, majority voting allows the Court to decide cases without giving
regard to all of the Justices. One side of the ideological spectrum can impose
its views to the exclusion of alternative perspectives.
Or to put it another way, the collective wisdom of the full group is
superior to that of a single Justice or a mere majority of Justices.32 Better

back to the Court. In some countries, such as Canada, medical aid in dying includes both
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. David Orentlicher, International Perspectives on Physician
Assistance in Dying, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 2016, at 6.
29
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–31. For further discussion of the arguments in favor of and in
opposition to a right to aid in dying, see DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: MAKING
MORAL THEORY WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 24–80 (2001).
30
As legal realism has shown, there is ample evidence of the lack of clear answers to many legal
questions.
31
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 11–12 (2004).
32
Jeffrey Abramson, Four Models of Jury Democracy, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 884 (2015).
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that the Court base its holdings on the understandings of all of the Justices
rather than on views that are particular to only some of the Justices.
Considering the Court’s decision-making process from the perspective of
interpretive theory leads to the same result. In deciding constitutional cases,
for example, the Justices could invoke the original intent of the Framers, or
they could rely on an evolving understanding of the constitutional text. Using
different theories of interpretation often will yield different results, and we
lack a clear basis for preferring one interpretation over the other.33
Or even if we could agree on a single theory of constitutional interpretation,
different Justices still will reach different conclusions in many cases. For
example, in the District of Columbia v. Heller34 gun rights case, both the
majority opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia and a dissenting opinion
authored by Justice John Paul Stevens cited original intent as the basis for their
understandings of the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms.35
Other perspectives on judicial decision-making also favor consensus
decision-making. For example, legal judgment reflects a number of personal
qualities, including intelligence, wisdom, courage, and temperance,36 and
some Justices will be strong in some of those qualities, but not others.
Consensus judicial decisions draw on the strengths of all of the Justices. By
way of analogy, voters commonly wish they could elect a president with the
best qualities of each of the different candidates.
Empirical evidence supports the view that a group decision by nine
Justices will be sounder than would decisions by a single Justice or a simple
majority of Justices. For example, studies on decision-making demonstrate
that better outcomes result when the decisions are made by a group of
persons who come to the table with different strategies for deciding. In a
study that looked at this question, researchers found that a group of good
problem solvers who employ a diversity of problem-solving approaches can
outperform a group of problem solvers whose problem-solving skills are
stronger but who employ problem-solving approaches that are alike.37
Overall, “heterogeneous groups outperform homogeneous groups on tasks
requiring creative problem solving and innovation, because the expression
of alternative perspectives can lead to novel insights.”38
33
Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049,
1051–52 (2006).
34
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
35
Id. at 574–603; id. at 63738, 640–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36
Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 189–94 (2003).
37
Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of HighAbility Problem Solvers, 101 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 16385, 16385 (2004).
38
Deborah H. Gruenfeld et al., Group Composition and Decision Making: How Member
Familiarity and Information Distribution Affect Process and Performance, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 4 (1996).
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This last point is worth emphasizing. When people with different
perspectives make decisions together, they can identify solutions that none
of them acting alone would have recognized. Their different ideas can
combine to identify new approaches.39 Thus, rather than merely splitting
their differences, they can discover win-win outcomes that make for better
overall results.40
Similarly, when a group of Justices decides a case, the quality of their
decision-making is better when the Justices bring different perspectives to
the table than when they are like-minded.41 We are better off with Justices
who have different theories of constitutional interpretation, such as
originalism and living constitutionalism, than Justices who all subscribe to
the same theory of judging. We also are better off with Justices who have
different ideological leanings, different life experiences, and different races
and sexes, than with Justices who share similar ideological predispositions,
life experiences, races, and sexes.42
If decisions are better made when they are made by people with different
perspectives, then it doesn’t make sense for the Supreme Court to decide by
a majority vote. Majority voting allows for decisions based on a narrower
rather than broader range of perspectives, thereby diminishing the quality of
the decisions. It is incoherent to value a diversity of perspectives and then
employ a decision-making process that frequently disregards a major part of
that diversity. During the Court’s 2019 term, for example, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor dissented in 28% of the Court’s cases, with a 44% dissent rate
when the Court was not unanimous.43 In those cases, the Court’s decisions
lacked the perspective of its only minority female member. Similarly, Justice
Clarence Thomas also dissented in 28% of cases and 44% of cases when the
Court was not unanimous.44 In those cases, the Court’s decisions lacked the
perspective of its only minority male member. No other Justice’s voice was
excluded as often as were those of Sotomayor and Thomas,45 and, with five
39
SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF IN THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 93–95 (2017).
40
See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
41
See Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM.
J. POL. SCI . 617, 627 (1992) (observing that the Court makes better decisions when the Justices come
from different schools of thought).
42
PAGE, supra note 39, at 115–16.
43
Frequency in the Majority, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2
020/07/Frequency-in-majority-7.20.20.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2021) (providing data from the October
2019 term). That is, when one looks at cases decided by an 8-1, 7-2, 6-3, or 5-4 vote, Justice Sotomayor
dissented 44% of the time. Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. During the Court’s 2020 term, the dissent rates changed somewhat. Justice Sotomayor was
still the most frequent dissenter, in 31% of all cases and in 55% of non-unanimous cases. Frequency in
the Majority, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Frequency7.2.21.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2021) (providing data from the 2020 term). Justice Thomas was still the
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white male Justices on the Court, it was impossible for the Court to render a
decision that lacked the perspective of a white male Justice. Incorporating
minority viewpoints is an important reason why studies of juries find that
the unanimous jury is preferable to the non-unanimous jury.46
Indeed, empirical research has repeatedly shown that unanimity fosters
more extensive and considered jury deliberations.47 When unanimity is
required, juries have more “robust discussions,” while supermajority juries
are more focused on which verdict they should reach.48 As a result, the
non-unanimous juries tend to end their deliberations soon after the
supermajority secures enough votes to settle on a verdict.49 In addition,
unanimous juries are more thorough in their evaluations of the evidence and
the law, and mock jurors deciding under a unanimity rule take more time for
their deliberations, discuss more issues, and are more satisfied with their
final verdicts.50
Importantly, when juries must decide unanimously, the majority gives
greater consideration to minority viewpoints. Those in the minority
participate more in the jury’s deliberations, and their perspectives play a
greater role in shaping the jury’s decision.51
We see the same benefits of consensus decision-making on European
constitutional courts. At the U.S. Supreme Court, Justices meet in
conference after a week of oral arguments to vote on cases and assign
opinions for drafting. All of the Justices present their thoughts, but there is
little deliberation during the conferences. As Justice Scalia observed about
the practices of the Court, “To call our discussion of a case a conference is
really something of a misnomer. It’s much more a statement of the views of

most frequent dissenter among conservative Justices, in 19% of all cases and in 30% of non-unanimous
cases. Id. But, Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer dissented at higher rates than Justice Thomas,
with Justice Kagan dissenting at 25% and 45%, respectively, and with Justice Breyer dissenting at 24%
and 42%, respectively. Id. During the 2018 term, Justices Thomas and Neil Gorsuch dissented the most,
both in 28% of all cases and in 45% of non-unanimous cases. Frequency in the Majority, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_30_19-18.pdf (last visited
Nov. 28, 2021) (providing data from the 2018 term). Justices Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg were
the next most frequent dissenters, both at 24% and 39%, respectively. Id.
46
Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement:
The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 204–05 (2006). Nonunanimous juries are permitted in state civil courts; until the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Ramos
v. Louisiana, states were permitted to use non-unanimous criminal juries, with Oregon being the last state
to allow non-unanimous verdicts. 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394–95 (2020).
47
Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating
Groups, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 669 (2001); Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 46, at 229.
48
Valerie P. Hans, The Power of Twelve: The Impact of Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil Jury
Decision Making, 4 DEL. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2001).
49
Devine et al., supra note 47, at 669.
50
Id.
51
Valerie P. Hans, Deliberation and Dissent: 12 Angry Men Versus the Empirical Reality of Juries,
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 587 (2007).
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52

each of the nine Justices.” In contrast, their European counterparts discuss
cases at greater length, sometimes for days of argument and persuasion, to
reach a consensus decision.53
One might ask whether the experience with juries carries over to judicial
benches. There are significant differences between trial juries and appellate
benches. Still, we can be confident about the benefits of consensus
decision-making from the European experience. Just as unanimous juries
deliberate longer and give greater consideration to minority viewpoints, so
do European constitutional courts.
Moreover, the similarities between juries and judges are much more
important than the differences. Consider, for example, the question whether
the original intent of the Second Amendment supports an individual right to
keep and bear arms. In deciding that question in Heller, the Justices
examined a body of evidence, including the legislative history, public
understandings of the Second Amendment’s text, and understandings of late
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century legal experts.54 The Justices
then decided whether that evidence pointed to an individual right or a right
of militias.55 Similarly, juries in criminal cases have to consider a body of
evidence and decide whether that evidence points to the defendant’s
innocence or guilt.
Justices and jurors both have to apply legal standards to the facts of a
case. The Supreme Court might have to decide what the drafters of a
constitutional or statutory provision intended by their words, and jurors
might have to decide what parties to a contract intended by their words.
Similarly, Justices or jurors might have to decide whether evidence of a
physician’s conduct constitutes negligence and whether the patient was
harmed as a result. As Jeffrey Abramson has observed, juries decide matters
that are a hybrid of law and fact.56 Accordingly, we can safely conclude that
just as unanimity improves decision-making on juries, it will do so on
appellate courts.
In addition, the differences between juries and courts strengthen the
argument for unanimous decisions by courts. While juries and courts both
decide questions of fact and law, jury decisions are more fact-based and
therefore more demonstrably accurate or inaccurate. Scientific analysis, for
example, can reliably identify the father of a child in a paternity dispute.
Scientific analysis cannot, however, tell us how to balance concerns about
the sanctity of life with the autonomy of a patient who desires aid in dying.
52

EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN
SUPREME COURT 285 (1999).
53
John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 1671, 1693–94 (2004).
54
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581–610 (2008).
55
Id.
56
Abramson, supra note 32, at 877–78.
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If we reject majority decisions by juries even when those decisions are
substantially fact-based, then it makes sense to reject majority decisions by
courts for decisions that are more subjective in nature and therefore about
which reasonable people will differ.
While the jury principle of unanimity fits well with judicial
decision-making, the majority principle for legislative bodies or elections does
not. When elections are held, all voters are eligible to cast a ballot. When
legislators assemble, they represent all members of the jurisdiction.
Accordingly, majority voting ensures that each member of the relevant
constituency is given equal weight. But appellate courts are not representative
bodies, nor are they supposed to be. Thus, the Supreme Court might have a
two-thirds majority of conservative or liberal Justices at the same time that the
public is evenly divided between conservative and liberal viewpoints. The
goal of a court is not to reflect the majority but to implement guiding legal
principles. And as discussed, that is best accomplished by ensuring that
decisions are based on a broad range of perspectives rather than the
perspectives of one side of the ideological spectrum.
Decisions that are representative of the full court have another important
virtue: they have greater legitimacy.57 When critical issues can be decided by
a 5-4 Court, the losing side can easily feel that the decisions are based on
ideology rather than the law. Consider in this regard the Court’s controversial
5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore58 that decided the 2000 presidential election in
favor of George W. Bush.59 In that case, the majority was composed of the
conservative wing of the Court, with the minority comprising the liberal wing
of the Court. Many members of the public concluded that the conservative
Justices sided with Bush because he was the more conservative candidate.60
Concern about legitimacy is a key reason why Chief Justices, such as John
Marshall, adopted a norm of unanimous decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court
in past years and why multiple European high courts operate with a norm of
decisions without dissent today.61
57
PAMELA C. CORLEY, AMY STEIGERWALT & ARTEMUS WARD, THE PUZZLE OF UNANIMITY:
CONSENSUS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 7–10 (2013).
58
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
59
See Laurence H. Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 571,
574–76 (2002) (“[B]y December 2000 the Court’s stock of political and moral capital sufficed to enable
it in essence to dictate the succession to the presidency, through the agency of the electoral college, [to]
the candidate[,] [George W. Bush] with half a million fewer popular votes nationally than his opponent[,]
[Al Gore] . . . .).
60
Id. at 576, 602.
61
RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 10–11; JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A
NATION 292–93 (1996). To be sure, it is important not to overstate the legitimacy argument. Some
research suggests limits to its relevance. According to one study, for example, on issues of high salience,
where people generally have settled views, it may not matter whether the Court decides by a 9-0 or 5-4
vote. Michael F. Salamone, Judicial Consensus and Public Opinion: Conditional Response to Supreme
Court Majority Size, 67 POL. RSCH. Q. 320, 332 (2014). However, on issues of low salience, for which
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The legitimacy concern applies not only to how decisions are viewed by
the public, but also how they are viewed by lower courts. When the Supreme
Court decides a case with dissenting opinions, or with concurring opinions
that disagree with the reasoning of the majority, lower courts are less likely
to follow the Court’s decision.62
One might wonder whether a requirement of unanimity goes too far in
compensating for the problems with majority voting on courts. One Justice
with an idiosyncratic view could block the entire Court from resolving a legal
question.63 Should we prefer a supermajority vote over a unanimous vote?
Supermajority voting does not ensure ideological balance. As the
experience with non-unanimous juries indicates, even supermajorities can
reject minority perspectives.
In addition, we need not worry about a requirement of unanimity.
Justices are carefully screened before nomination for their training,
experience, and perspectives, and the vetting process excludes candidates
with views that are too extreme and not adequately based on an
understanding of the U.S. legal system.64 Justices come to the bench with
more in common than members of many juries.65 For example, eight of the
nine current Justices attended Harvard or Yale for law school.66 More
most people may not have settled views, the size of the Court’s majority may matter more. Id. In addition,
on some issues, a divided opinion may actually promote legitimacy by demonstrating that both sides of
the issue were heard by the Justices or by indicating the presence of sympathetic Justices on the Court.
Id. See also Kelemen, supra note 17, at 1356 (observing that the publication of dissents can promote
legitimacy via greater transparency).
But note that it is difficult to separate public views about legitimacy from public views about the
content of the Court’s decisions. For example, when the Court issues more liberal decisions, its approval
rises among Democrats and falls among Republicans. Conversely, when the Court issues more
conservative decisions, Republicans become more approving and Democrats become less approving.
In 2015, for example, after the Court recognized same-sex marriage and upheld the Affordable Care
Act, Democratic approval rose to 76% while Republican approval dropped to 18%. Jeffrey M. Jones,
Republicans’ Approval of Supreme Court Sinks to 18%, GALLUP (July 16, 2015),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/184160/republicans-approval-supreme-court-sinks.aspx. In contrast, in 2021,
after a term with a mix of conservative and liberal decisions, 51% of both Democrats and Republicans
(and 46% of independents) expressed approval. Jeffrey M. Jones, Supreme Court Job Approval Dips
Below 50%, GALLUP (July 28, 2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/352895/supreme-court-job-approvaldips-below.aspx. These survey results support the view that a requirement of unanimity would result in
similar levels of approval across party lines.
62
PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 77–78, 85
(2010); Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction
to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POLS. 534, 546 (2002).
63
Melissa Schwartzberg, Voting the General Will: Rousseau on Decision Rules, 36 POL. THEORY
403, 404–05 (2008).
64
BARRY J. MC MILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44235, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS:
PRESIDENT’S SELECTION OF A NOMINEE 8–10, 14–15 (2021).
65
I am grateful to Howard Watts for pointing out this comparison.
66
Ilana Kowarski, Where Supreme Court Justices Earned Law Degrees, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/whe
re-supreme-court-justices-earned-law-degrees.
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importantly, principles of game theory provide reassurance that each Justice
would choose cooperation over gridlock. As discussed in Part VI of this
Article, when people must work with a group of peers on a frequent basis to
decide matters, they realize that they are better off developing collegial
rather than oppositional relationships.67
Unanimous decisions also help mitigate an important concern with
group decision-making—the “groupthink” problem. As Irving Janis has
written, an excessive tendency toward uniform thinking by members of a
group can lead to defective decision-making and ill-fated decisions.68
Important examples include the Kennedy administration’s decision to
authorize the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the Johnson administration’s
escalation of the Vietnam War.69 While research has not validated aspects
of Janis’ theory,70 we do need to address the pitfalls of group
decision-making, and one valuable way to do that is to broaden the diversity
of group members. Diversity increases the likelihood of good decisions and
reduces the chances that groups will fall into the trap of groupthink or other
decision-making errors.71 Accordingly, unanimous decisions made by
Justices who diverge in their perspectives will generally do a better job of
avoiding decision-making failures than will decisions made by a majority of
Justices who are like-minded in their views.
I have explained how unanimous voting yields better results than
majority voting on courts. Unanimity also is required to satisfy principles of
due process.
II.JUDICIAL UNANIMITY AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
When the Constitution provides its fundamental guarantee of due
process, it promises individuals that they will receive an impartial hearing
before a neutral court.72 And a neutral court decides cases without any
personal, political, or other partiality.73

67

See infra notes 193–198 and accompanying discussion.
IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES
vii, 9 (2d ed. 1982).
69
Id. at 31–32, 98–101. See also 1961–1968: The Presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/19611968/foreword (last visited Sept. 22, 2021) (providing background on the Bay of Pigs invasion and the
escalation of the Vietnam War).
70
CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS
SMARTER 6–7 (2015).
71
Id. at 143, 146–48.
72
Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State Judicial
Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 34, 36–37 (2014).
73
Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 499–509
(2013).
68
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But the Supreme Court is not a neutral court. It has either a conservative
or liberal majority of Justices, and overall, that makes for either a
conservative or liberal predilection.74 When a court has a liberal majority,
parties promoting a conservative viewpoint are disadvantaged. Similarly,
when a court has a conservative majority, parties promoting a liberal
viewpoint are disadvantaged.
To be sure, if judging entailed a purely objective application of legal
rules and principles to the facts, a Justice’s ideology would not matter. But,
as discussed in the previous section and as empirical evidence demonstrates,
a Justice’s ideology does matter.75 Some Justices take more conservative
positions, while others take more liberal positions.76 A conservative majority
will render different decisions on campaign finance, environmental
regulation, or religious freedom than will a liberal majority. When the
Court’s decisions reflect the philosophical leanings of the Justices, and
decisions can be determined by a majority on one side of the ideological
spectrum, our judicial system denies an impartial hearing to parties on the
other side of the ideological spectrum. And that is fundamentally unfair in a
constitutional system that promises litigants due process in court.
Because it is unfair for litigants to have their cases decided by an
ideologically skewed court, due process requires reforms to ensure that
decisions by the Supreme Court reflect both sides of the ideological
spectrum. Scholars and others have proposed a number of approaches to
bring ideological balance to the Court, including changes in the judicial
appointment process.77
The simplest path to ideological balance would start with the Court
rendering its decisions unanimously. That way, Justices on both sides of the
ideological spectrum would have to support the Court’s opinions. When a
74
LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 103 (2013).
75
Id.
76
Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How
Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1491–92 (2007).
77
See, e.g., Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148,
181205 (2019) (supporting either (1) an expansion of the Court to include all judges on the U.S. Courts
of Appeal with randomly chosen panels of nine serving for two weeks at a time and no more than five
members of a panel having been appointed by a Democratic or Republican president or (2) a
fifteen-Justice Court with five Justices affiliated with the Democratic Party, five affiliated with the
Republican Party, and five chosen by the ten party-affiliated Justices); David Orentlicher, Politics and
the Supreme Court: The Need for Ideological Balance, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 411, 42329, 43234 (2018)
[hereinafter Orentlicher, Ideological Balance] (proposing ideological balance via expansion of the Court
to include four Justices chosen by a Democratic nominating committee, four by a Republican nominating
committee, and four by a joint Democratic-Republican nominating committee, and a supermajority
requirement of ten votes so at least two Justices from each of the three blocs would have to agree on
every decision); Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the United States
Supreme Court, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 547, 55356 (2018) (arguing for a Court with four Justices affiliated
with the Democratic Party and four affiliated with the Republican Party).

2022]

JUDICIAL CONSENSUS

319

majority can write the Court’s opinions, then minority perspectives can be
excluded. For many critical issues, the Court’s majority can impose its
perspective on the country, leaving the minority perspective unrepresented.
Here, too, the example of the jury is illustrative. For the Court to be
impartial, this Article argues, it should issue decisions that reflect the views
of Justices from both sides of the ideological spectrum. Similarly, in defining
the meaning of an impartial jury, the Court has required that jurors be drawn
from a fair cross-section of the community.78 As the Court also has noted,
the due process standards for jury size and jury voting reflect the goal of
group deliberation undertaken by a jury that is representative of the
community.79 Too small a jury prevents a sufficiently diverse jury, and as
discussed above, majority voting discourages thorough deliberation and
denies consideration of minority viewpoints.
As mentioned, the Supreme Court itself observed a norm of consensual
decision-making for most of its history. During its initial years, the Court
followed the British practice of opinions issued seriatim (separately) by each
Justice. But that approach made it difficult for lawyers, lower court judges,
and the public to know what the Court actually held.80 This made for “a weak
and divided Court unable to assert any real authority.”81 As a result, Chief
Justice Oliver Ellsworth tried to increase the Court’s power by introducing
the idea of a single opinion for the Court.82 While Ellsworth was
unsuccessful, his successor, Chief Justice Marshall, institutionalized a
policy of unanimous decisions, so the Court could speak with a unified
voice. Instead of each Justice authoring an individual decision to be
presented seriatim, the Justices agreed on a consensus position.83 During
Marshall’s first four years as chief, all of the Court’s opinions were issued
for the Court as a whole, with one concurring opinion and no dissenting
opinions.84 In Marshall’s overall tenure as Chief Justice, dissents were

78

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1975).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
80
M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 283, 308.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 310. Ellsworth presided from 1796 to 1800. NCC Staff, The Most Underrated Founding
Father: Oliver Ellsworth?, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Apr. 29, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/themost-underrated-founding-father-oliver-ellsworth.
83
Henderson, supra note 80, at 310, 313.
84
Sandra Day O’Connor, William Howard Taft and the Importance of Unanimity, 28 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 157, 157–59 (2003). Scholars differ on the question of authorship. In one view, opinions were
authored by an anonymous Justice and issued under the name of Chief Justice Marshall because he
announced the opinions. Henderson, supra note 80, at 313; 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A.
JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN
MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 382-387 (1981). In another view, Marshall both authored and delivered the
opinions issued under his name. O’Connor, supra, at 159; KATALIN KELEMAN, JUDICIAL DISSENT IN
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 59 (2018).
79
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85

written in around 6% of cases. The norm of consensus was maintained by
later Chief Justices such that until 1941, the Justices typically spoke
unanimously. From 1801 through 1940, only about 8% of cases included a
dissenting opinion.86
The norm against dissent was so strong that it was incorporated in the
American Bar Association’s Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924.87 From then
until 1972, according to the Canons, it was of “high importance” that judges
or Justices on courts of last resort “use effort and self-restraint to promote
solidarity of conclusion.”88
Importantly when single opinions were the norm, Justices on both sides
would move toward the other side to reach a consensus. The lead Justices
would shape their opinions to secure broad support from their colleagues.
Robert Post has discussed an illustrative example from an opinion by Chief
Justice William H. Taft in a 1929 case, Wisconsin v. Illinois.89 As Post
describes it, Taft had expended considerable effort on an opinion to advance
“a very broad theory of federal commerce power that he fervently supported.
But in order to attain unanimity he agreed to censor his own views . . . .”90
In a letter to a fellow Justice, Taft wrote,
I worked all summer on the constitutional part of the opinion . . .
and satisfied myself completely by an examination of the briefs
and the authorities on the subject, [but in the end, the opinion
represented] a real sacrifice of personal preference . . . . [I]t is
the duty of us all to control our personal preferences to the main
object of the Court.91
This was not the only example for Taft. As Post writes, Taft “was willing to
go to extraordinary lengths to modify his own opinions to reach out to others.”92
85
Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
769, 776, 778 (2015). Another calculation puts the dissent rate under Marshall at 4%. Henderson, supra
note 80, at 323.
86
Sunstein, supra note 85, at 771, 776.
87
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship,
and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1284 (2001).
88
CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 19 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924), reprinted in LISA L. MILORD, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 137 (1992). See also Post, supra note 87, at 1284 & n.55
(discussing Canon 19).
89
278 U.S. 367 (1929). The case involved a challenge by Wisconsin and other states regarding the
amount of water withdrawn by Illinois and the city of Chicago from Lake Michigan. Id. at 399. The
opinion addressed Commerce Clause issues related to congressional power to regulate withdrawal of
water by the states. Id. at 375.
90
Post, supra note 87, at 1312.
91
Letter from William Howard Taft to Pierce Butler (Jan. 7, 1929) (on file with the Library of
Congress).
92
Post, supra note 87, at 1312. See also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving
Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 917–20 (2003) (discussing Taft’s
efforts at achieving consensus).
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With their reshaping of opinions to broaden their majority, drafting
Justices were able to encourage their Court colleagues in the minority to join
them. Indeed, the minority Justices regularly changed their votes from
opposition to agreement to forge consensus. An important study in this
regard compared the votes of the Justices taken at their post-oral argument
conferences with the final votes of the Justices over a fourteen-year period
under Chief Justice Morrison Waite.93 During that time in the late 1800s, the
rate of dissenting final votes was only 9%. But the dissent rate for conference
votes was 40%.94 While non-unanimous votes often became unanimous,
there was little movement in the opposite direction. When the conference
vote was unanimous, the final vote was unanimous 98.8% of the time.95
The Taft Court produced similar data. Of 1,028 cases that were decided
unanimously with published opinions, only 58% were unanimous in
conference. The other 42% of cases included cases in which a Justice
changed a dissenting conference vote (30%) or an uncertain vote (12%).96
And the move from the minority to the majority did not result from
movement in areas of law that might seem less contentious. Rather,
movement occurred across all subject matters. For example, among the civil
liberties cases that had a non-unanimous vote in conference in the Waite
Court study, 60% became unanimous on final vote.97
Perhaps the most famous example of movement by majority and
minority to reach consensus occurred after the Court abandoned its norm of
consensus. While the norm no longer prevailed, Chief Justice Earl Warren
recognized the importance of unanimity in critical cases and therefore turned
a 6-3 majority into a 9-0 majority for the Court in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka.98
Movement by both the majority and minority to common ground also
occurs in European countries whose highest courts do not allow dissents.99
93
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 363, 365–69 (2001). The researchers were able to conduct the study because
they had access to Chief Justice Waite’s docket books for cases between 1874 and 1887. Id. at 363.
94
Id. at 366.
95
Id.
96
Post, supra note 87, at 1332–33.
97
Epstein, Segal & Spaeth, supra note 93, at 367.
98
347 U.S. 483 (1954); S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 689,
696–700 (1971). In Brown, the Court declared segregated schools unconstitutional. Brown, 347 U.S. at
495. Before the Brown case was reargued under Chief Justice Warren, the preliminary vote on Brown,
under Chief Justice Frederick Moore Vinson, was 4-5. Ulmer, supra, at 691–92. See also Michael J.
Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 VA. L. REV. 1613, 1613–14 (2004) (reviewing history of Court deliberations
in Brown).
99
See RAFFAELLI, supra note 16, at 11 (observing that “in many systems where separate opinions
are forbidden, and most notably in the CJEU, the decision-making process is a truly collegiate one, and
all judges cooperate in the drafting of the final decision”). The CJEU refers to the Court of Justice of the
European Union. Id. at 5. See also François Luchaire & Georges Vedel, La transposition des opinions
dissidentes en France est-elle souhaitable? “Contre”: le point de vue de deux anciens membres du
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John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino provide an illustrative example from
Italy. The Italian Constitutional Court considered a statute that made it
impossible to sue or prosecute the five highest public officials in Italy.
Initially, by an 8-7 vote, the court’s justices deemed the law unconstitutional
and required a constitutional amendment to enable the law. To persuade the
minority to join the court’s opinion, the majority still deemed the law
unconstitutional but held that it could be revised to satisfy constitutional
requirements without the need for a constitutional amendment.100
In short, the historical record illustrates a critical point. Under a norm of
consensus, the U.S. Supreme Court did not simply follow the majority
position, with the minority giving an unqualified acquiescence. Rather,
Justices on both sides of the ideological spectrum moved toward their
counterparts to fashion an opinion onto which all could sign. The norm of
consensus did much to promote the due process principle of a judicial
process that lacks an ideological bias and instead reflects both sides of the
ideological spectrum.
And as discussed earlier,101 the need to find consensus does not simply
cause Justices to split their differences. Rather, when people with different
perspectives make decisions together, they can identify win-win solutions
that none of them acting alone would have recognized.
In contrast to its earlier norm of unanimity, consensus on the Court today
occurs less than half of the time—during the past decade, one or more
Justices dissented in 54% of rulings.102 Chief Justice John Roberts spoke
wisely when he observed that greater consensus on the Court is desirable
and that the Court functions best “when it can deliver one clear and focused
opinion.”103 More importantly, decision-making by consensus would bring
the Court into conformity with the constitutional requirement of due process.
Due process is important not only for the litigants before a court but also for
the public generally. This is especially the case when the Court decides issues of
great moment and that go to the heart of our representative system of government,
such as the question of political gerrymandering. For these questions, it is critical
that the public feel that the Court reaches its decisions fairly.

Conseil constitutionnel [Is the Transposition of Dissenting Opinions in France Desirable? “Against”:
The Point of View of Two Former Members of the Constitutional Council], CAHIERS DU CONSEIL
CONSTITUTIONNEL (July 2000), https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/nouveaux-cahiers-du-conseilconstitutionnel/la-transposition-des-opinions-dissidentes-en-france-est-elle-souhaitable-contre-le-pointde-vue-de (observing that “the absence of dissenting opinions facilitates consensus”).
100
Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 53, at 1693–94 n.98.
101
See supra text accompanying notes 38–40.
102
Unanimous Cases, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/
Unanimous-7.2.21.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2022). Between 1941 and 2013, the dissent rate averaged
around 60%. Sunstein, supra note 85, at 780.
103
Reynolds Holding, In Defense of a Divided Court, TIME (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,1590461-1,00.html.
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But concerns about the role of judicial ideology have markedly
increased in recent years. A majority of Americans once expressed strong
confidence in the Court. According to a July 2021 Gallup poll, only 36% do
now.104 By ensuring ideological balance, a requirement of unanimity would
do much to restore public faith in the Court’s decision-making process. As
a corollary, it also would do much to defuse the highly contentious nature of
judicial appointments. If people on both sides of the ideological spectrum
knew their views would be reflected in Court decisions, they would not have
to fight so hard over appointments to the Court.
In addition to ensuring better decisions and a fairer process,
decision-making by consensus provides other important benefits. For example,
unanimous decision-making ensures greater stability in the law. When the
Supreme Court can decide cases by a majority vote, changes in the composition
of the Court can lead to major changes in the Court’s jurisprudence. With
unanimous decision-making, legal doctrine will develop along a steadier path.
Unanimous decisions also provide greater clarity. With a single,
consensus opinion, the Court would abandon not only the practice of
dissenting opinions, but also the practice of concurring opinions. When the
majority issues multiple opinions explaining its decision, it can be difficult
for lower courts, public officials, lawyers, and the public to know exactly
what the Court held.105
The proliferation of concurring and dissenting opinions also has raised
concerns about judicial grandstanding.106 When Justices stake out their own
positions rather than speaking with a single voice, they can elevate their public
profiles to the point of attaining celebrity status.107 That kind of prominence
can entice Justices to concur or dissent for self-interested reasons.108
It is often said that concurring and dissenting opinions are important
because they provide a road map to future majority opinions.109 But road
maps for future majority opinions can be found in court filings and academic
and other commentary. Justices also can indicate future evolution of the law
through their questions at oral argument. More importantly, as mentioned,
104
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consensus decisions do not create as great a need for change over time. It is
precisely because a majority on one side of the ideological spectrum can
impose its views that there is pressure for revisiting the issue and following
the logic of dissenting opinions.
While there are other ways to promote judicial neutrality, a practice of
unanimous decision-making has important advantages. It can be
implemented by the Justices as a matter of Court rule, as in the past, rather
than through legislation or constitutional amendment.
Moreover, it provides a more reliable guarantee of ideological balance than
do other proposals. For example, while reform could set the number of Justices
at an even number with half the seats reserved for conservative appointments
and half for liberal appointments,110 ideological balance could be disrupted if
one of the Justices changed ideological perspective, as has happened with
Justices in the past111 (by way of the “ideological drift” phenomenon).112
Other proposals also fall short in terms of ideological balance. For
example, it has been common to recommend that the Court’s composition
change more frequently, for example, by having fixed terms of eighteen
years rather than life tenure. 113 Or we might have a rotating bench of nine
Justices, with federal appellate and district court judges eligible for service,
and each bench of nine presiding for a matter of weeks or months. 114 Still,
with either of these approaches, for any given case, there would be a
majority of Justices with either a conservative or liberal predilection.
Indeed, any proposal that retains majority voting will lack ideological
balance on many cases. 115
In addition, proposals to deviate from a bench with lifetime tenure can
exacerbate rather than defuse ideological polarization. As discussed later in
the section on game theory,116 consensus decision-making is more likely
when people have frequent and regular interactions with each other on an
indefinite time horizon.
This is not to entirely reject other proposals for reform. Many of them
would reinforce the benefits of unanimous decision-making. For example, if
appointments to the Court were evenly divided between conservative and
liberal Justices, that would enhance ideological balance.
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But it still would be important to require unanimous decision-making to
ensure that all decisions reflect both sides of the ideological divide. In other
words, unanimity is a necessary reform that can be supplemented with other
reforms. And because unanimous decision-making can be implemented by
the Court on its own, while other reforms would require legislation or a
constitutional amendment, it would be important to start the process of
reform by requiring unanimous decisions.
The German Constitutional Court provides a useful example of
consensus-based decisions supplemented by other policies. While dissenting
opinions are permitted, they are discouraged, and they are written
infrequently. Consensus is the norm in Germany.117 An important factor in
promoting consensus lies in the appointment process. The court’s justices
must secure approval by a two-thirds vote of the legislators, and this
excludes nominees with extreme opinions in favor of more moderate
nominees who are more closely aligned in their perspectives.118
In sum, the due process principle of a neutral court demands an
ideologically balanced court, and unanimous decision-making provides that
kind of balance. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s experience in the past with
a norm of consensus demonstrates that the Court could function effectively
with a requirement of unanimity. As mentioned, Part VI will consider in
greater detail why the Court would function effectively with a requirement
of unanimity.
III. JUDICIAL UNANIMITY AND ORIGINAL INTENT
What would the Framers think about this? On one hand, they did not
include in Article III of the Constitution a requirement for ideological
balance on the Supreme Court. On the other hand, they did not reject
ideological balance—Article III is silent on the question. Moreover, the
Framers recognized the need to amend the Constitution with a Bill of Rights
that includes the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of impartial courts.
The Framers’ intent is more consistent with unanimous decision-making
than with majority decision-making on the Court. While the Constitution
does not speak to judicial decision-making, the Framers were well aware of
how high courts decided cases in England and the colonial states. There were
two models for decision-making. First was the seriatim model, which the
Supreme Court initially adopted, in which each Justice issued an opinion.
117
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This was the predominant model both in England and the colonies and had
a long pedigree in England, dating back to the time of William the Conqueror
in the eleventh century.119 Most likely, the Framers assumed the Justices of
their new Supreme Court would decide cases seriatim.
But as discussed, when each Justice issues an opinion, it can be difficult
to discern a rule of law. So, some British and American courts went in the
other direction, as the Supreme Court did under Chief Justice Marshall, and
decided cases with a single opinion for the court. A notable example in
England was the King’s Bench in England between 1756 and 1788 under
Lord Chief Justice William Murray, known as Lord Mansfield.120 The
Virginia Supreme Court, then known as the Court of Appeals, also
experimented with a single decision of the court when Edmund Pendleton
served as chief judge from 1778–1803.121
What is important about both of these models, seriatim opinions or
single opinions, is that each Justice has an equal voice in shaping the Court’s
decision. With seriatim opinions, they all speak separately, while with single
opinions, they all speak together. Majority decisions, on the other hand,
often exclude the views of some of the Justices and as many as four of the
nine on the bench. A requirement of unanimity would once again ensure that
all of the Justices have a voice in the Court’s opinions.
With unanimous opinions and their ideological balance, the Court also
would be more faithful to the Framers’ basic design for our constitutional
system. The Founding Fathers worried greatly about “factions” pursuing their
self-interest to the detriment of the overall public good and the interests of the
minority. Accordingly, the constitutional drafters devised a system that they
thought would contain the influence of factions.122 For example, Federalist
No. 10 discussed how the nature of a national government could mitigate
factional conflict.123 Narrow factions thrive most in small, homogeneous
constituencies in which it is more feasible for a parochial interest to represent
majority sentiment. In large, heterogeneous constituencies, on the other hand,
narrowly focused factions find it difficult to attract broad support for their
views. Large republics like the United States generate a great variety of
interests and factions, and that would prevent a single faction from substituting
its preferences for the common good or disregarding the rights of the
minority.124 As James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 10, as the size of a
nation expands:
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[Y]ou take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison
with each other.125
In addition, by having a representative democracy instead of a pure
democracy modeled on the town meeting where all citizens have a vote, the
new country could rely on its legislators to promote the public good. As
discussed in Federalist No. 10, the Constitution’s system of representation
would “refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of Justice will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”126
These two factors—a large republic and a select body of elected
officials—would further combine to protect against factional influence.
Elected officials with larger constituencies would become less attached to
local, parochial interests and more devoted to the good of the nation.127
Relatedly, legislators would ensure that public policy reflects the interests
of both the majority and minority.128
The Framers supplemented these safeguards with an additional protection
against factional dominance. Federalist No. 51 spoke to the remedy for
situations in which factions overcome the obstacles of large, heterogeneous
constituencies and are able to gain political power.129 By dividing the national
government’s power among three branches and pitting the interests of one
branch against the interests of the other branches, the Constitution would
ensure that the anti-social efforts of factions in one branch of government
could be checked by the other branches of the national government.130
Just as the Framers wanted legislators to promote the welfare of all rather
than the interests of some, so did they want a judiciary that would rise above
faction. The Framers did not expect—nor did they desire—a Supreme Court
that would reflect the views of only one side of the ideological spectrum.
Indeed, when Alexander Hamilton explained the Constitution’s appointment
provisions in Federalist No. 76, he emphasized the need to avoid nominations
that reflect partiality instead of the overall public interest.131
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The increasing politicization of Supreme Court nominations illustrates the
Framers’ concerns about factional activity. When a bare majority of five Justices
can determine the path of the law, the stakes are high with each new
appointment to the Court, and interest groups on both sides of the political aisle
wage aggressive campaigns to support or oppose the President’s nominees.
Over time, the battle over Court appointments has become increasingly
divisive. While the U.S. Senate approved the appointment of Justice Scalia
by a vote of 98-0 in 1986, his successor, Justice Neil Gorsuch, reached the
Court on a 54-45 vote in 2017. Similarly, the Senate approved Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg by a vote of 96-3 in 1993, while her successor, Justice
Barrett, squeaked by on a vote of 52-48 in 2020.132
Partisan opposition can be especially fierce when the appointment will
decide whether the Court has a conservative or liberal majority. Thus, when
Democratic President Barack Obama nominated U.S. Court of Appeals
Judge Merrick Garland to a Court left with a 4-4 ideological balance after
the death of Justice Scalia in 2016, the Republican-controlled Senate
blocked the appointment by denying a committee hearing or floor vote.133
Ultimately, the strategy paid off when the election of President Donald
Trump gave Republicans the chance to restore a conservative majority on
the Court with the appointment of Justice Gorsuch.
If decisions were issued unanimously, then there would be much less at
stake with each appointment. No longer could each side of the ideological
spectrum hope to control the Court’s direction by securing a majority of
like-minded Justices on the bench. The factional battle over judicial
appointments that the Framers feared would be much defused.
The Due Process Clause and original intent both support ideological
balance on the Court. As discussed in the next section, the Court’s
precedents are consistent with such a requirement.
IV.JUDICIAL UNANIMITY AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court has not considered the question of an appellate
court’s ideological skew. Rather, the Court has addressed concerns about a
single judge’s ideological preferences. In its cases, the Court has observed
that constitutional problems do not arise when a judge favors one or another
ideological view.134 Anyone with the appropriate training and experience for
the judiciary will have opinions on important legal issues. According to the
132
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Court, due process prohibits partiality toward a party to a proceeding, not
partiality toward a legal view that the party might advocate.135
But there are important reasons to distinguish Court discussions of the
issue. As indicated, the Court has not decided the question whether an
appellate court must exhibit overall ideological balance. Rather, the Court
has considered the question of partiality for individual judges. Moreover, it
has done so in cases addressing other issues of judicial neutrality. In other
words, its observations on ideological partiality are dicta not essential to the
holdings of the Court. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, for
example, the issue before the Court was whether a state could prohibit
judicial candidates from announcing their positions on issues that might
come before them if elected.136 In another case, Tumey v. Ohio,137 the issue
before the Court was whether judges could have a financial stake in the
outcome of their decisions.138
Further, the Court’s reasoning in those and other cases is consistent with
a due process argument in favor of a Court that decides cases in an
ideologically balanced way. In Republican Party of Minnesota, the Justices
discussed the kinds of partialities that should disqualify a judge, and the
Court wrote that a judge’s ideological predilection is not disqualifying in the
way that a personal financial interest is disqualifying.139 It took that view in
Republican Party of Minnesota and earlier cases because anyone who has
the experience and training that would be desirable in a judge will inevitably
develop an ideological leaning.140 And as discussed earlier, there is much
benefit to having a bench of Justices with a range of ideological perspectives.
But the fact that we have individual Justices with ideological leanings does
not prevent us from ensuring an overall ideological balance on the Court.
Under a fair reading of the Constitution, litigants ought to be able to ensure
that their cases are decided in an ideologically balanced way.
In addition, it is difficult to identify a good reason for permitting the
Court’s holdings to be decided by a majority on one side or the other of the
ideological spectrum. While we can point to the principle of majority rule to
justify conservative or liberal control in the executive or legislative
branches, popular majorities do not deserve special recognition in a judicial
branch that should be guided by legal principle rather than prevailing
sentiment. There is no good normative argument for majority rule on the
135
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Supreme Court or other courts of appeal. I will take up this argument in more
detail in the next section.
V.MAJORITY RULE LACKS NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION
As Jeremy Waldron has observed, majority decision-making is
generally assumed to be appropriate on courts, and the question of its
propriety has attracted little attention.141 But when one considers the
arguments in favor of majority rule, they come up short.
For example, proponents of majority decision-making argue that the
majority is more likely to be correct than the minority. This is accurate as
far as it goes, but it ultimately fails to justify majority decision-making by
appellate courts. For just as a majority is more likely to be correct than a
minority, so are a unanimous Court’s decisions more likely to be correct than
those of a simple majority.142 If one believes that there is a right answer that
the Justices can discover, then unanimous decision-making should be
preferred to majority decision-making.
There is a more important argument in favor of unanimity. As indicated
before, there generally is no “right” answer for important legal questions.
The best answer is the answer that reflects the full range of perspectives.
Consider in this respect the previous example of a right to aid in dying. If
one prizes self-determination, then one might conclude that a right to aid in
dying is the better policy. Similarly, if one prizes the preservation of life,
one might say that a ban on aid in dying is the better policy. But when both
values are important, the best policy will be the policy that reflects both
values rather than simply vindicating the value that has majority support.
Or consider the contrast between an election and a judicial decision.
When voters go to the polls, they typically face a binary choice—either a
Democrat or Republican will win.143 In such situations, the argument for
majority voting makes sense. If only one side can win, going with the
majority is most consistent with each vote counting equally. But Supreme
Court decisions do not involve binary choices where only one side can win.
Rather, the Court can choose among options that reflect the concerns of both
141
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sides of the ideological spectrum. With abortion, for example, a very
conservative Court might reject a right absent a threat to the pregnant
patient’s life. A very liberal Court might permit abortion freely until birth.
And a Court of conservatives and liberals can recognize a right that better
reflects both the interest in individual autonomy and the interest in the
preservation of life. In other words, the Court does not have to make a binary
choice between a right and no right; rather, it decides how broad or narrow
the right will be. Instead of allowing abortion until birth when it recognized
a constitutional right, the Court allowed abortion until viability.144 Instead of
permitting minors to obtain abortions on their own, the Court allowed states
to require parental consent (with a judicial bypass option).145 When dealing
with Supreme Court decisions, the best way to ensure that the views of all
Justices are taken into account is to fashion a decision that all of the Justices
can support.
Proponents of majority decision-making also tout its efficiency.146 It is
easier to assemble a majority of five than a consensus of nine. In this view,
a requirement of unanimity would result in too much gridlock and not
enough cases being decided. In his defense of simple majority decisions,
Guha Krishnamurthi cites the problem of gridlock as the key deficiency of
supermajority voting rules. As he observes, under such a regime, when the
Justices would reach supermajority decisions, they would operate quite
effectively. But when they would fail to reach a decision, a lower court or
someone else would end up deciding the issue, and that makes for a less
desirable process.147
Critics of consensus decision-making overestimate the problem of gridlock.
It is not a significant problem with juries and their requirement of unanimous
decisions. Nor is it a problem for high courts in other countries or for the
Supreme Court under its previous norm of consensus before 1941. Moreover,
when one considers principles of game theory, it becomes clear that gridlock
would not be a significant problem for the Court today either. I take up the
concern about gridlock in more detail in the next section of this Article.
VI.POTENTIAL CONCERNS WITH JUDICIAL UNANIMITY
In general, concerns about cost, efficiency, and fairness have limited
policies to address judicial partiality.148 For example, one solution is recusal
144
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of the partial judge. But if reasons for recusal are not strictly limited, litigants
might clog the courts with baseless recusal motions,149 and lawyers might
exploit the rules to game the system in favor of their clients.150 Members of
the Court also have worried about strict recusal rules because there is no one
who can step in for a disqualified Justice.151 And if the concern is ideological
partiality, all Justices would have to recuse.
A requirement of unanimity avoids the concerns raised by judicial
disqualification or other remedies. Unanimous decision-making promotes
impartiality not by removing partial Justices, but by counterbalancing their
partialities. Moreover, its implementation would be simple—it can be
adopted by the Court on its own without the need for legislation, executive
action, or constitutional amendment. Indeed, this Article argues that the
Court is obligated by the Due Process Clause to adopt a requirement of
unanimity, supplemented by other reforms, to ensure ideological balance.
Still, one might worry that a unanimity requirement would lead the
Court to deadlock with some frequency and leave too many issues to be
decided by the lower courts.152 As veto points theory instructs, the greater
the number of decision-makers with a veto power, the less likely that
changes in policy will occur.153 It is generally easier to secure the agreement
of two officials than that of three or more.154 If unanimous decisions are
required, the Court would potentially have nine veto players.
The potential for gridlock is not a sufficient reason to override principles
of due process. Juries have as many as twelve veto players, and the potential
for a hung jury does not create a sufficient basis for relaxing the requirement
of a unanimous jury in criminal or federal civil cases. In addition, limiting
veto points on the Court comes at a substantial price—not having decisions
made by Justices with different perspectives, experiences, ethnicities, races,
and sexes.
Several considerations indicate that the problem of deadlock will be
small and therefore that the benefits of unanimity would far outweigh its
costs. First, as veto points theory recognizes, the number of veto players is
not the only significant factor—so is the congruence of the veto players’
149
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views. Replacing Justice Anthony Kennedy with Justice Brett Kavanaugh
did not have a practical effect on the ability of the current Court to reach
consensus decisions since Justice Kavanaugh’s perspectives lie within the
ideological range already determined by Justice Sotomayor on the left and
Justice Thomas on the right.156 If an opinion would be conservative enough
for Justice Thomas, odds are it would be conservative enough for Justice
Kavanaugh. Functionally under a requirement of unanimity, a Court of nine
will generally have only two true veto players, though the identities of those
players will vary somewhat from case to case.157
In addition, the Court has an obligation to resolve critical legal
questions, and we can expect Justices to fulfill the duties of their position.
As Justice Elena Kagan observed when the Court had a 4-4 ideological split
between the death of Justice Scalia and the appointment of Justice Gorsuch,
the Justices had a greater need to find common ground, and they worked
harder to do so.158 To be sure, the Court also punted on some cases, deferring
consideration until a ninth Justice was appointed.159 But the option of
deferring consideration offers little potential for gain when decisions must
be reached unanimously. In those circumstances, there would not be any
looming changes in the Court’s composition that would allow one or the
other side of the ideological divide to gain control. In short, while the Court’s
discretion to deny certiorari would allow it to abstain from deciding hard
cases, its essential constitutional role would discourage abstention.
Similarly, the self-interest of the Justices would reinforce their fidelity
to their judicial responsibilities. The Justices would have a strong personal
incentive to find common ground. Supreme Court Justices want to leave
their imprint on the law—after spending years, if not decades, maneuvering
for a Court appointment and having reached the pinnacle of the legal
profession, they would be driven by their desire to leave an important
judicial legacy. If the Justices spent their years on the Court bogged down
in gridlock, they would not be able to issue key decisions that would allow
155
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ice-elena-kagan-says-court-had-reach-more-consensus-after-antonin-scalias-death/646125001/ (Sept. 8,
2017, 7:19 PM).
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See May Mon Post, Justice Scalia’s Death Throws SCOTUS Term into Turmoil, JDSUPRA (Aug.
8, 2016), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/justice-scalia-s-death-throws-scotus-78633/ (describing
instances in which the Court deferred consideration after Justice Scalia’s death).
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them to make a difference in resolving major legal questions. Accordingly,
they would come to accommodations that would let them decide cases.
Moreover, decision-makers adjust their behavior to their decision-making
rules. As the discussion of jury deliberations indicates, when a simple majority
can prevail, people tend to look for simple majority positions.160 On the other
hand, when unanimity is required, people will look for positions that can
generate consensus. Consider, for example, the Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.161 After the initial oral argument, the Justices voted, at
their private conference, to allow separate schools for Black and white
students. But with a re-argument and the replacement of Chief Justice Fred
Vinson, the Justices split 6-3 against separate schools. While the case could
have been decided along those lines, Chief Justice Earl Warren believed it
important that the Court strike down school segregation unanimously, and he
was able to achieve that goal by writing a consensus-driven opinion.162
Or consider how a norm of consensus operates in the Quaker
community. As an ethnography of Quaker decision-making observes, the
process rests on a principle of “unity,” in which members of the faith
community meet together on equal footing to identify resolutions to which
all members can subscribe: “This does not mean that everyone has to
completely agree with every aspect of the decision, but it does mean that
everyone must feel it right to let the decision go ahead.”163
Of course, what is “right” for Quakers is based on what is right “in the light
of God’s guidance.”164 For a secular court, what is right would depend on
considerations of legal principle, public welfare, and other important values.
What is critical for Quakers’ decision-making, however, is not that they seek
unity according to God’s guidance, but that they are committed to finding unity.
The Quaker business meetings are premised on the assumption that each
person has a valuable perspective and that all perspectives should be given
careful consideration. To be sure, this does not mean that all views must be
accepted—the goal is to come to a good decision—but it does mean that all
views should be taken seriously.165
During the meetings, as the Friends share their perspectives, a Clerk is
tasked with identifying a “sense of the meeting” and drafting a resolution
(the meeting “minute”) which all can support.166 The Quaker approach “can
achieve a unity which incorporates the minority position.”167 As the
160
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ethnographers concluded, “there are in the end no deep divisions, no winners
and losers in the conventional sense. . . . It is a method which assumes
ownership of the decision by all who are present.”168
This last point is critical in terms of the ability of a group to reach
consensus. As principles of dispute resolution recognize, people need to be
involved in the process of reaching a decision for them to make the
accommodations necessary for a consensual outcome.169 Under a rule of
unanimity, all nine Justices would participate in the decision-making
process, and that would give them all the kind of stake in the process that
makes consensual decision-making work.
Or to put it another way, consensus decision-making promotes healthy
competition among different viewpoints, while the ability to secure majority
control of the Court invites hypercompetitive behavior that can stifle the give
and take important to civil discourse and attainment of the common good.170
Consensus decision-making also has been a hallmark of Native
American indigenous communities. As Kahente Horn-Miller has written,
such a process is designed to engage all members of the community who
rely on “calm deliberation, respect for diverse views, and substantial
agreement” to reach a resolution that is “in the best interests of the
community and not only themselves as individuals.”171
And this is not surprising. Recall the earlier point that when people from
different perspectives make decisions together, they are more likely to come
to novel insights and win-win outcomes.172
Other empirical evidence supports this Article’s view that Justices can
decide their cases unanimously. Most importantly, as discussed, the Supreme
Court operated under a norm of consensus for most of its history. The Court
not only can decide cases unanimously, it once did so more than 90% of the
time, even when not required to.173
This experience reflects the fact that there always will be common
ground on which the majority and minority can settle. Indeed, even with a
majority decision-making rule, Justices often seek common ground. Thus,
for example, the Roe Court did not reject a right to abortion, nor did it
168
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recognize a right to abortion until birth. It reached a position that recognized
interests on both sides of the issue, with a right only until viability. Similarly,
in Heller, the Court neither rejected an individual right to keep and bear
arms, nor did it recognize an unlimited right to possess and carry guns. As
the majority wrote:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.174
While the Heller Court was divided by 5-4, there is good reason to think
that the four dissenting Justices—and dissenting Justices in other cases—would
have been more amenable to joining the majority on a Court required to find
consensus. As discussed, when courts issue consensus decisions, the majority
works with the minority to fashion an opinion onto which all can sign.
That the Court will decide cases regularly under a requirement of
unanimity provides reassurance on another concern. One might worry that if
the Court adopts a unanimity rule now, it would preserve the current
ideological bias of its decisions. According to this concern, some Justices
would block new decisions in order to preserve their preferred precedents. But
as discussed, we can be confident that the Justices will decide cases, that they
will meet their judicial responsibility to resolve critical legal questions. And
the consensus that emerges will be the same whether the revised or overridden
precedent was more conservative or more liberal than the new decision.
For the same reason, we need not worry that a unanimous Court would
lead to a structural bias in favor of the currently dominant political
philosophy. According to this line of reasoning, the difficulties in reaching
a unanimous decision would lead the Court to become a less active Court,
leaving more legislative or executive actions intact. For a red federal or state
government, that would mean fewer conservative laws being struck down,
and for a blue federal or state government, there would be fewer liberal laws
struck down. Here, too, the commitment of the Court to its judicial
responsibilities would prevent abdication, and again, it would reach the same
consensus whether it was considering a conservative law or a liberal law.
Historical data are consistent with the view that a unanimous decision
rule would not lead to a less active Court. While not dispositive, the Court’s
caseload over time is instructive. As Cass Sunstein found, a key factor in the
Court’s abandonment of its norm of consensus was the ascent to Chief
Justice of Associate Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in 1941. In contrast to his
174
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predecessors who believed it important for the Court to speak with one
voice, Stone encouraged the expression of dissenting and concurring
viewpoints.175 If consensus decision-making invites judicial restraint, then
one would expect the Court to have decided more cases after 1941 than
beforehand. In fact, there was little change in the immediate years after 1941,
and starting in 1947, there was actually a substantial decline in the number
of cases decided, a decline that lasted until 1970.176 More specifically, from
1927 to 1946, the median number of signed decisions was 149.5.177 Between
1947 and 1970, the median dropped to 99, rising to 129 in the several years
after 1970.178 It appears that, just as Chief Justice Stone influenced the
Court’s decision-making norm, his successors influenced the Court’s
workload.179 And importantly, the Court’s degree of activity did not seem to
reflect whether or not it operated under a norm of consensus.
One also might wonder whether the changes on the Court or the political
environment that led to the abandonment of the norm of consensus would
preclude a restoration of that norm. Sunstein’s careful analysis of the Court’s
change in practice is reassuring. As mentioned, he concluded that Chief
Justice Stone drove the elimination of the norm.180 If the Court could decide
on its own to jettison its norm of consensus, the Court can decide on its own
to bring the norm back.181
Other scholars have suggested other factors in the departure from
consensus, but those potential contributors seem much less important or
consistent with a return to consensus decisions. For example, scholars have
pointed to the almost complete turnover in the Court’s membership between
1937 and 1941.182 The new Justices may have been much less receptive to a
norm of consensus. But as Sunstein observes, Felix Frankfurter, Hugo
Black, William Douglas, and other new Justices adhered to the norm of
consensus for the years between their appointments and 1941.183 And even
if the departure from consensus was driven by multiple Justices rather than
175
Sunstein, supra note 85, at 790–94. See also Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein & William J.
Dixon, On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL.
361, 384 (1988) (attributing “much of the responsibility” for abandoning the norm of consensus “to the
leadership of Harlan Fiske Stone”).
176
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Plenary Docket in the 1970’s, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1730–32 (1978).
177
Id. at 1730. It makes sense to start around 1927 because Congress gave the Court much greater
discretion to decline cases under the Judiciary Act of 1925.
178
Id. at 173031.
179
Id. at 1733–34.
180
Sunstein, supra note 85, at 790–94, 816.
181
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Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada, 52 SUP. CT. L. REV. 379, 409–10 (2010).
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just Chief Justice Stone, the current Justices could come together today and
agree to decide their cases unanimously.
Pamela Corley and colleagues have cited the Judiciary Act of 1925’s
grant of discretion to the Court over its docket, but that change does not
connect well with the change in the norm of consensus. After 1925, the Court
could decline certiorari for a large number of uncontroversial cases that
previously had taken up much of the Court’s attention.184 With fewer
uncontroversial cases, one would expect the percentage of non-unanimous
cases to go up significantly, even if the total number of non-unanimous cases
did not change. But the departure from consensus didn’t occur until 1941,
well after the increase in Court discretion.185 In addition, a study of the Taft
Court found that the Justices were just as likely to reach consensus on their
discretionary docket as on their mandatory docket.186
That restoring a norm of consensus is feasible also is suggested by other
examples. Consider in this regard the overseas experience. As mentioned,
high courts in a number of European countries issue a single opinion without
dissents or concurrences. While unanimity is not required, the requirement
of a single opinion leads the judges in these countries, including France,
Italy, and Belgium, to seek consensus as much as possible.187 Judges taking
the minority view are more likely to participate in the court’s deliberations.
On these courts, “the decision-making process is a truly collegiate one, and
all judges cooperate in the drafting of the final decision.”188 In Italy, for
example, a member of the court drafts an opinion that “is examined and
discussed by the other members, and only when the agreement of the whole
court is reached does the draft become the opinion of the court.”189
Juries in the United States provide a clear example of effective
decision-making by consensus. Criminal court juries typically have twelve
members, and they have to reach unanimous decisions.190 Hung juries occur,
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but not very often. Moreover, juries reach their unanimous decisions in a
setting that allows for less common ground than does a decision by a judicial
bench. A criminal jury must acquit or convict.192
Of course, requirements for juror unanimity reflect the gravity of the
decisions at stake. Whether a jury convicts or acquits has enormous
consequences for a criminal defendant. Just as much is at stake with the
Supreme Court. Its decisions can have the same consequences for defendants
when it hears criminal appeals. Other constitutional decisions also can have
profound consequences for the parties and the public generally.
Game theory provides further reason to believe that the Court would find
common ground regularly under a supermajority requirement. Game theory
can identify the kinds of relationships that are likely to encourage
cooperative rather than oppositional strategies.193 The Supreme Court
includes important elements of cooperative relationships. For example,
when individuals have an ongoing relationship with frequent and repeated
interactions, as with members of the Court, they are much more likely to
choose cooperation with each other than when they have a one-shot
relationship.194 Cooperation is also more likely in relationships with an
indefinite time horizon, as with Justices who have lifetime appointments,
than when there is a finite time horizon. Finally, cooperation is more
common among individuals who come to their relationship with equal status
and authority. That is true about Supreme Court Justices, except perhaps
with Chief Justices. The extra authority of a Chief Justice may not be that
important, but if it is, we could make the chief’s role a rotating position, as
is the case with some state supreme courts.195
The equal status of Justices is particularly important. Unlike Congress,
where legislators can employ their veto points and other strategies to improve
their chances for preserving or gaining the power of the majority, Justices on
a Court that requires unanimous decision-making cannot create a power
191
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imbalance. Game theory principles make it unsurprising that the Supreme
Court once was able to observe a norm of consensus decision-making.
Indeed, game theory principles already foster an important degree of
cooperation among the Justices. As Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum have
written, the highly interactive nature of an appellate bench encourages a
norm of collegiality among Justices or judges, and while divided decisions
are not uncommon, unanimous decisions are the most common result.196
Over the past decade, for example, 46% of the Supreme Court’s merits
decisions were 9-0.197 The next highest percentage was for 5-4 decisions,
and those accounted for 20% of decisions.198
Consensus-based decision-making also works well in non-governmental
settings. As discussed, the Quaker business meeting relies on a principle of
unity. The American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs (the “Council”) also provides a useful example. The Council
develops guidelines for physicians on the full range of ethical questions in
medical practice, including genetic testing, end-of-life decisions, organ
transplantation, and conflicts of interest.199 The Council also hears appeals
of disciplinary proceedings against physicians by state and other medical
societies.200 The Council has nine members who reach all of their decisions
by consensus.201 Under its requirement of unanimity, the Council has been
able to decide its appeals and issue a comprehensive ethics code that
includes guidelines on many controversial matters.202
For example, the Council has endorsed a pilot program to test financial
incentives for organ donations,203 rejected physician participation in capital
punishment,204 and issued guidelines for the ethical use of fetal tissue for
196
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transplantation or research. Even though people generally, and Council
members specifically, have strong and divergent views on these issues, the
Council was able to forge a consensus.
One might wonder whether decision-making by consensus on the
Supreme Court really would yield ideologically diverse decisions. If all
Justices were either conservative or liberal, then even unanimous decisions
would reflect one side of the ideological spectrum. To some degree, this is a
theoretical rather than practical concern. The Martin-Quinn scores that have
measured the ideological leanings of Justices since 1937 have found a mix
of conservative and liberal Justices throughout the entire eight-decade
period.206 Still, to the extent that we have to worry whether decision-making
by consensus will ensure ideological balance, the answer is to supplement a
requirement of unanimity with other reforms to ensure ideological diversity
among the members of the Court.
The analogy to the jury is useful here as well. It is essential for juries to
decide their cases unanimously. And it also is important to supplement that
requirement with measures to promote jury diversity. Thus, for example,
peremptory strikes may not be used in a racially-biased manner, and courts
have revised the way they fill their jury pools to increase the diversity of
potential jurors.
If the Court decided all of its cases by consensus, what would that mean
for the role of the judiciary in deciding cases? Courts often are viewed as
engines of social reform. If the Justices had to find common ground, would
the Supreme Court change from a leader of social change into a follower of
social change that is championed by the president or Congress?
Of course, incremental change can be a virtue. By making limited rather
than expansive changes, courts reduce the risk of causing great harm from
erroneous decisions.207 Proceeding in smaller steps allows courts to test their
theories carefully and maximize the likelihood that they are taking legal
doctrine in the right direction. In addition, by proceeding at an incremental
pace on important issues, courts promote discussion and deliberation by the
public and its elected officials on those issues and the opportunity for
meaningful participation in the decision-making process.208 Sweeping
decisions short-circuit the democratic process and can provoke stiff
resistance and a backlash that compromise the very principles that the courts
205
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were trying to advance and leave those principles with weaker recognition
in the end.209
But even when major change is important, the Supreme Court’s history
demonstrates that Justices from different sides of the ideological spectrum
can come together to issue pathbreaking decisions in appropriate
circumstances. In fact, many of the Court’s landmark decisions enjoyed
broad support among the Justices. When the Court struck down segregated
schools in Brown,210 and bans on interracial marriage in Loving v.
Virginia,211 the vote was unanimous.212 The Court also was unanimous in
recognizing the right to counsel for criminal defendants in Gideon v.
Wainwright,213 limiting presidential executive privilege in United States v.
Nixon,214 and establishing First Amendment limits on defamation suits in
New York Times v. Sullivan.215 Even what is perhaps the Court’s most
controversial modern opinion, Roe v. Wade, enjoyed strong support on both
sides of the ideological spectrum. In Roe, the Court’s 7-2 majority included
conservatives Warren Burger, Lewis Powell, and Potter Stewart.216
These kinds of decisions are not surprising. Recall the earlier point that
when people with different perspectives make decisions together, they can
identify solutions that none of them acting alone would have recognized.
Rather than merely splitting their differences, they can discover win-win
outcomes that make for better overall results.217
209
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Of course, not all landmark cases have been decided unanimously or
with only one or two dissenters, as with the Court’s 5-4 decision on the
constitutional right to same-sex marriage.218 Under a requirement of
consensus, would such landmarks be blocked?
The answer to that question likely turns on whether the majority drew
from both sides of the ideological spectrum, as in Roe. In such cases, as
suggested by the Court’s experience under its past norm of consensus,219 we
can expect a unanimous Court to preserve the majority’s general position,
with movement on both sides to find common ground. Consider in this
regard Brown. When the Court decided Brown by a 9-0 vote, rather than by
a 6-3 vote,220 it maintained the majority’s rejection of segregation in schools
while making other changes in the Court’s opinion to reach consensus.221
Similarly, with same-sex marriage, since the majority included the more
liberal members of the Court plus the conservative Justice Kennedy, a
unanimous Court likely would have recognized a fundamental right while
making other changes to secure the agreement of the full Court.222
In contrast, for 5-4 decisions that split on ideological lines, a
requirement of unanimity might have led to a different outcome, especially
if consensus decision-making were supplemented with other reforms to
promote ideological balance. Examples of such decisions include Shelby
County v. Holder223 and Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission.224
218
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ANALYSIS 134, 146 (2002) (identifying whether individual Justices were relatively conservative or
liberal).
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This prediction is supported by the fact that the Court solidified protections for the LGBTQ+
community in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), the case in which the Court held that
the federal civil rights act’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex in employment includes
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Notably, while Chief Justice Roberts dissented on the
right to same-sex marriage, Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 686–713 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), he joined the
majority in Bostock, so that case was decided 6-3 rather than 5-4 as in Obergefell. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at
1736.
In another example of a 5-4 decision whose majority drew from both sides of the ideological
spectrum, the Court rejected criminal prosecutions for the burning of a U.S. flag. Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989).
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570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A1; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates
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A unanimity rule also would insulate ideologically diverse decisions
from being overturned by a majority from just one side of the ideological
spectrum. For example, the right to abortion would have been much more
secure after the appointments of Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett
if the Court decided its cases unanimously.
In short, requiring consensus probably would have only a limited effect
on the likelihood that the Court would champion social reform. At the same
time, it would provide a fairer process for litigants, promote a more
deliberative and sounder decision-making process, and greatly reduce the
political maneuvering that has made for a drawn-out and highly partisan
judicial selection process.
CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court’s norm of deciding cases by majority vote
dates back more than 75 years, close examination demonstrates that it lacks
grounding in legal principle or empirical value. As the principle of due
process recognizes, it is important not only that a court reach good decisions,
but also that it make its decisions in a neutral fashion. With unanimous
decision-making, the Supreme Court can best satisfy both goals. It would
reach better decisions and do so in an impartial way.225
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rather than a blanket requirement of Miranda warnings per the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at
503 (Clark, J., dissenting in part). See also Martin & Quinn, supra note 221, at 146 (identifying Clark as
moderately conservative).
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